The Russian military response in August would go far beyond that necessary to restore the status quo in Ossetia. The Western recognition of Kosovo as an independent state in February was a more important factor on the road to war than typically recognized.
Russia was positioning itself to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states in retaliation for the recognition of Kosovo. The events that unfolded in the early days of August in South Ossetia, a deliberate escalation of violence in the run-up to the conflict, had the appearance of a Russian effort to establish facts on the ground and potentially annex the breakaway regions.
At the very least, it requires no stretch of the imagination to see how Georgian officials would believe that the clock was ticking, and if they did not risk military action, then Russia would annex the separatist enclaves and cement the frozen conflict on their territory with which they had lived since the early s. This meant they would have no hope of retaking the separatist regions, and potentially, no hope of getting into NATO either.
Facing what he thought to be an imminent political defeat, Saakashvili rolled the dice, and in his limited experience taking risks had worked out in the past. Accounts suggest that Georgian leadership did not believe it was facing full-scale invasion, but were more concerned with something akin to a slow-moving annexation, though afterwards Saakashvili would claim he thought Georgia was being invaded.
Gerard Toal, in his more recent account of this conflict in Near Abroad , makes a strong case that Georgian claims alleging a Russian invasion through the Roki tunnel prior to the August 7th assault by their forces were a post-hoc attempt to reverse-engineer the timeline of the conflict. From my own perspective, details of Russian troop movements during that final week remain somewhat murky, as there appeared to be a Russian troop rotation at the end of the Caucasus exercise, but before the events of August 7.
With the exception of a rapid-response force, Russian units had gone back to their bases in Russia, not expecting the Georgian attack to come so soon after the Caucasus exercise.
Senior U. On August 6, heavy fighting broke out between the two sides. The number of Russian proxies, auxiliary fighters, and so forth, that were operating among Ossetian militias is difficult to discern. Arguments also continue over whether the Ossetians had agency of their own in escalating the fighting. What is clear is that at this stage Georgia set up an operational command, began pulling most of the available units to the South Ossetian border, and ordered a partial mobilization of reserves.
Even the infantry brigade covering Abkhazia was detached to send elements towards the Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali. That evening Saakashvili made a televised address announcing a unilateral ceasefire as Georgian units continued moving to take up positions on the Ossetian border. Around 11 p. The 58th Army was on the road, as airborne units began moving towards rail and sea embarkation points.
Combat was intense the first three days, and Georgian forces had some successes in ambushing Russian troops, but missed key opportunities to destroy infrastructure that might have slowed the Russian advance. Russian units opened a second front from Abkhazia, towards Poti and Senaki, expanding their attack far beyond the immediate conflict zone into Georgia. Russian peacekeepers were engaged by Georgian forces early on, which Moscow later used as the casus belli , but this was mostly a fight between the Georgian army and the North Caucasus Military District.
At the outset, the correlation of forces, perhaps 12, Georgian regulars and 4, Interior Ministry units, favored Georgia. Between the 58th in Ossetia, and a large influx of airborne troops in Abkhazia, which had opened a second front, Georgian forces were in a no-win scenario. Georgian units retreated and eventually a ceasefire and withdrawal agreement for Russian troops was brokered with U.
The violence did not end there, as looting, forced displacement, and further tragedy followed after combat operations ended. Myths about what the United States could have or should have done persist. For one, some fault U. More to the point, how the United States was supposed to train Georgians to do combined arms maneuver with a hodgepodge of Ukrainian, Czech, Israeli, and Turkish equipment is a mystery.
Georgia did not lose for lack of arms or instruction, nor was it especially short of anti-tank guided missiles. The weapons Georgia bought were more than suitable to inflict costs on the vehicles and armor thrown at them by the 58th Army, and they did, although such gear certainly might not be effective today.
There is no evidence that it does now. More importantly, Georgia attacked Tskhinvali and faced Russian forces in a meeting engagement rather than mounting an organized defense. The Georgian military assaulted Tskhinvali more than once, and eventually retreated, with much of its equipment captured. The normative slogans that underwrote much of U. Previously he served as program manager at National Defense University. The views expressed here are his own.
Michael Kofman. By Yelyzaveta Yasko. Vladimir Putin continues to menace Ukraine with border region troop buildups and the threat of a major escalation in the seven-year war between the two countries. The best way for the West to deter Russia is to arm Ukraine. UkraineAlert Jul 13, By Peter Dickinson. Russian President Vladimir Putin has published a new essay on the "historical unity" of Russians and Ukrainians that illustrates the imperial thinking behind his ongoing seven-year war against Ukraine.
BelarusAlert Apr 14, By Brian Whitmore. Fears are growing that the rapidly expanding Russian military presence in Belarus will help transform the country into a new front in the Kremlin's war against Ukraine. The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters. The Eurasia Center's mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.
Image: Georgian soldiers seek cover near a blazing residential building following a Russian bombardment in Gori. August 9, This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged. Eurasia Center events. May 26, - A UN investigation concludes that the drone shot down on April 21 was struck by a missile from a Russian fighter jet.
May , - Russia sends several hundred unarmed troops to Abkhazia, saying they are needed for railway repairs. Georgia accuses Russia of planning a military intervention. Russia responds by moving its troops to the border, flying aircraft over Georgia, and beginning air strikes in South Ossetia.
August 10, - Russia moves tanks and soldiers through South Ossetia and into Georgia proper, advancing towards the city of Gori. August 12, - Russia calls a halt to its military incursion into Georgia and agrees to a six-point diplomatic push for peace. Bush announces humanitarian aid is to be sent to Georgia. It is also announced that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will be sent to France and Georgia for a diplomatic mission. August 15, - Saakashvili signs a cease fire agreement with Russia.
The deal is brokered by Sarkozy. August 16, - Medvedev signs the cease fire agreement. The United States began training 5, Georgian troops a few months later. Russia and its new president, Vladimir Putin first elected in , bitterly resented the loss of this buffer zone between Moscow and the West.
For its part, Georgia was moving further West, even joining the U. This process intensified after the election of pro-Western President Mikheil Saakashvili in It had to maintain its sphere of influence, and if it let Georgia go, then who could be next?
A convoy of Russian troops making its way through the mountains toward the armed conflict between Georgian troops and separatist South Ossetian troops on August 9, Sakaashvili also attempted to crack down on separatism within Georgia, which brought the long-running conflict in South Ossetia into the forefront again. After Georgia arrested four Russian military officers for suspected espionage, Russia responded by closing Georgian businesses and deporting Georgian citizens.
On August 8, , after months of back-and-forth accusations and provocations between the two sides, and a series of clashes between South Ossetian militia and Georgian military troops, Sakaashvili ordered his troops to capture the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali.
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